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1Introduction
The mingling of science and food is not a new phenomenon. In fact, genetic
improvement has played a major part in the development of our food supply for
thousands of years. Wine, cheese, and yogurt, for example, were created through
the use of microbes. Tangelos, white eggplants, and nectarines were products
of selective breeding. In addition, American eating has long strayed from the
predominant use of fresh, local, and natural foods. Food production has become
big business, with economy and convenience ruling the food industry now that
pesticides, preservatives, and processing have distanced food from the pure and
agricultural and turned it into a ready-to-eat commodity available immediately
on any supermarket shelf. Given its history of continually restructuring rela-
tionships with food, one would expect the public to accept any innovation, the
government to be able to respond to any new regulatory challenge. Yet, today's
crops have crossed a new line of agricultural creativity, and they have entered
the realm of the unimaginable. Biotechnology has turned genetic improvement
into genetic engineering; along with this new technology comes a barrage of new
social and regulatory issues and concerns.
Genetically engineered foods have the potential to make great steps toward
improving food and the environment. For example, biotechnology can be used
to increase the food supply, as it can make each acre of land more produc-
tive through the use of fewer chemical sprays and the introduction of greater
resistance to
1
2plant diseases and pests.1 By reducing the use of chemicals in agriculture,
water contamination and the exposure to and disposal of pesticides could be
curtailed. Scientic alteration is the future of the food industry{ the USDA
alone has around 1000 applications and notications for eld tests of genetically
engineered produce, an indication of big changes ahead in what we eat and how
it is grown{ but are we ready for it?
Calgene, a California biotechnology company, has spent $25 million on a
genetically engineered fruit, the Flavr-Savr tomato, in order to have a quality
tomato on the market year round. Instead of being forced to use green-picked
tomatoes that are ripened for supermarkets using ethylene gas (the tomato's
natural ripening agent), Calgene's product enables retailers to have a contin-
uous supply of red, ripe tomatoes. To accomplish this, Calgene's researchers
extracted the one gene in the tomato (out of its approximately 35,000) that
controls softening during the ripening process. Then, they reversed the order of
this gene's components, copied the result, and stuck it back into the fruit. This
resulted in a slow ripening tomato that can stay longer on the vine to gain more
avor and that will keep its avor over an extended shelf life (approximately 3
weeks).
Yet, what some view as a breakthrough others view as a curse. There has
been a widespread backlash against genetic alteration of food. Consumer groups
and advocacy organizations such as the Pure
1A step further than improving a plant's resistance to disease is the possibil-
ity of splicing genes that can be used as vaccines into plants, so that people who
eat foods from these plants could potentially gain immunity to certain diseases.
~, Industry, Government Pleased with Public's Acceptance of Biotech Plants,
Food Chemical News, December 11, 1995, at 18.
2
3Food Campaign have sprung up to resist the inux of genetically altered
foods into the marketplace, and some chefs refuse to use such products in their
kitchens. 2 In fact, Calgene has experienced continuous scal losses despite
thorough regulatory approval of its product, as the Flavr-Savr has only attracted
$14 million of the $4 billion that American consumers spend on tomatoes each
year.3 The predominant fear is that engineers will create exotic or monster plants
that will have the ability to do things that could never occur in nature and that
can have uncertain eects upon those who eat the products of such plants{or
at the very least, that plants could become weed-like, resistant to disease and
pesticides, and spread.
Those concerned about genetic alteration of food cite various reasons to
support their position. First, the genetic engineering process is often considered
dierent from traditional plant breeding. While conventional plant breeders
regularly attempt to introduce desirable genes from wild varieties into promising
commercial varieties of food crops, they usually do so by transferring large
numbers of various genes, and the results are often fairly unpredictable. In
contrast, genetic engineers transfer very few genes (in the case of the Flavr-Savr,
only one gene), bringing changes that are very clearly dened and predictable.
Just as people fear genetic selection in humans becoming a quest to create ideal
ospring by choosing very
2 This has even reached Cambridge, MA, as the menu at Christopher's
restaurant
in Porter Square conspicuously states that the establishment does not use
any
genetically engineered foods!
~ Greg Beaubien, Battle Over Genetics, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov.
19, 1995, at
65.
3
4animal genes inserted into plants were extracted form non-kosher animals,
such as pigs. In addition, many believe that it would be generally dangerous to
the natural balance of the ecosystem to give plant species animal characteristics,
or to apply gene technology to other parts of the food chain. ~
Finally, hesitancy toward genetically engineered crops is culturally based.
People are opposed to the idea of mono-crops in agriculture and giving up the
notion of season. We are used to not having all fruits and vegetables at their
peaks 365 days a year, and as a society we have come to expect certain times of
the year to yield the best avors of dierent products. Tomatoes are supposed
to be best in the summer, so it is strange to think of January as a time for fresh
summer produce. After all, if we could control the weather, would we really
want to have a perpetual spring and eliminate the winter completely?
This paper will address the U.S. response to the present and future use of the
genetic alteration of food through the analysis of the pioneer food product{ the
Flavr-Savr tomato{ which was the rst genetically altered food to be approved
for the United States market. As the rst bioengineered produce to clear reg-
ulatory hurdles, the Flavr-Savr required governmental agencies to adapt their
current standards to a new realm of food and agriculture and to consider how
genetically altered foods t into the United States regulatory scheme. By trac-
ing the regulatory history of the Flavr-Savr and examining both agency and
public
4For example, a recent article in ~ contemplated transferring human
genes to cows so that they could produce 'human milk for babies. February 9,
1996, at 19.
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5specic genes for the unborn, people envision the gene selection process
becoming so specic as to take all that is natural and diverse out of agricultural
production.
In addition, there is hesitancy to accept the transfer of genes inter-species.
Biotechnology can go a notch further than nature by mingling the genes of not
just plants with other plants, but even of plants with insects, plants with bac-
teria, plants with viruses, and plants with animals. The Flavr-Savr is actually
a relatively unique example in the world of genetically altered foods, because it
involves the modication of only one gene, and that is a gene from the tomato
itself (in addition to helper genes for antibiotic-resistance); thus, the Flavr-Savr
could arguably have been developed eventually through traditional methods and
is not necessarily as controversial as other products on the drawing board. For
example, there is greater potential for adverse eects if genes are switched from
common allergens (such as peanuts) into other plants instead of switched within
one plant species, as allergens may transfer to the resulting foods. Gene trans-
plants from animals into plant products (such as one now abandoned project
to transplant a gene from a cold-resistant sh into a tomato to make it frost-
resistant) are even more counterintuitive to nature, and could potentially result
in plants with strangely un-plant-like characteristics. There are also ethical and
religious reasons often cited to oppose the use of animal products in agriculture.
For example, vegetarians would not necessarily eat foods derived from plants
engineered with animal genes, and kosher individuals may not eat such foods if
the
4
6response to genetically altered food products, one can also project the likely
regulatory future of genetically altered foods.
I have already addressed the basic characteristics of the Flavr-Savr, its an-
ticipated place within the food industry, and popular concerns with genetically
altered food. The rest of this paper will be divided into three sections. Section
I will trace the Flavr-Savr's path of USDA regulatory approval and the USDA's
current procedure for approval; section II will similarly study the FDA's pro-
cess of regulation. Finally, Section III will, in light of the procedures presently
in place, consider the future of USDA and FDA regulations for genetically al-
tered food products, and whether we can anticipate an eventual consolidation
of regulatory schemes.
Section I: USDA Regulation and the Flavr-Savr Tomato
Statutory Authori t~
The USDA has broad statutory authority to regulate agricultural products.
The Federal Plant Pest Act, which was enacted on May 23, 1957, gives the USDA
authority to protect American agriculture against disease, injury, or damage by
regulating the movement and existence of any plant pest when there is a danger
of the dissemination of such a pest. 5The USDA has interpreted its power
to include authority over genetically altered plants, which can potentially be
considered plant pests.
The Federal Plant Pest Act authorizes the USDA to:
~ 7 U.S.C.S . x 150 et. seq.
6
7promulgate such regulations requiring inspection of products and articles of
any character whatsoever and means of conveyance, specied in the regulations,
as a condition of their movement into or through the United States, or interstate,
and imposing other conditions upon such movement, as [is deemedil necessary to
prevent the dissemination into the United States, or interstate, of plant pests.6
The act denes plant pest as:
any living stage of any insects, mites, nematodes, slugs, snails, protozoa, or
other invertebrate animals, bacteria, fungi, other parasitic plants or reproductive
parts thereof, viruses, or any organisms similar to or allied with any of the
foregoing, or any infectious substances, which can directly or indirectly injure
or cause disease or damage in any plants or parts thereof, or any processed,
manufactured, or other products of plants.7
The Federal Plant Pest Act also states that the USDA may refuse to issue
a permit for the movement of any plant pest when.
. such movement would involve a danger of dissemination of such pests. 8
Furthermore, the USDA may enforce its decisions not only through civil and
criminal penalties, but also through remedial measures:
Whereas, the existence of a plant pest new to or not theretofore known to be
widely prevalent or distributed within and throughout the United States on any
premises in the United States would constitute a threat to crops, other plant
life, and plant products of the Nation and thereby seriously burden interstate
or foreign commerce, whenever the Secretary determines that an extraordinary
emergency exists because of the presence of such plant pest on any premises
in the United States, and that the presence of such plant pest anywhere in
the United states threatens the crops, other plant life, or plant products of
the United States, the Secretary may. .. seize, quarantine, treat, apply other
remedial measures to, destroy, or otherwise dispose of. .. any product or article
of any character whatsoever.9
6 ~ TJ.S.C.S. 5 l5Oee.
~ 7 IJ.S.C.S. 5 lSOaa(c). Under 7 CFR 5 340.1, individuals are instructed
to consult APHIS to determine whether an organism is a plant pest and thus
subject to regulation. In addition, 7 CFR x 340.2 lists groups and taxa of
organisms which are deemed to be or to contain plant pests.
8 ~ U.5.C.S. S lSObb(b).
7 U.S.G.S. 5 lSOdd(b) (1)
7
8Finally, the Plant Quarantine Act,10 originally enacted on August 20, 1912,
gives supplementary authority to the USDA to regulate the importation and
movement of nursery stock and other plants which may harbor injurious pests
or diseases, and directs that such plants must be grown under certain USDA
imposed conditions once in the United States.
7 CFR ~ 340: The Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced throuah Genetic Enaineeriricr
The USDA's regulatory authority over genetically altered foods is codied
under 7 CFR x 340, which regulates the introduction of organisms and prod-
ucts altered or produced through genetic engineering which are plant pests or
which there is reason to believe are plant pests. While 7 CFR x 340 was pro-
mulgated in June 1987, the USDA amended it in 1993, partially in response
to its regulatory experience with the Flavr-Savr. Before promulgating the 1993
amendments, there were two major steps in the approval process for genetically
altered agricultural products: a grant of a permit for introduction of the or-
ganism, and a grant of non-regulatory status. In the course of its path toward
USDA approval, the Flavr-Savr followed both of these steps.
1. Acquiring a Permit for Introduction
At the time Calgene sought the introduction of the Flavr-Savr into the mar-
ket, the rst procedural step for a genetically altered product under 7 CFR x
340 was obtaining a permit for the
10 ~ U.S.C.5. x 151 et. seq.
8
911 ~ CFR x 340.1.
127 CFR x340.4(b).
introduction of any regulated article through importation, interstate move-
ment, or release into the environment. Regulated articles are, generally speak-
ing, organisms that have been altered or produced through genetic engineering
that are plant pests or that reasonably could meet the denition of plant pest.
Regulated article is specically dened in 7 CFR x 340 as follows:
any organism which has been altered or produced through genetic engineer-
ing, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or vector or vector agent belongs
to any genera or taxa designated in x340.2 and meets the denition of a plant
pest, or is an unclassied organism and/or an organism whose classication is
unknown, or any product which contains such an organism, or any other or-
ganism or product altered or produced through genetic engineering which the
Director, BEEP, determines is a plant pest or has reason to believe is a plant
pest. Excluded are recipient microorganisms which are not plant pests and
which have resulted from the addition of genetic material from a donor or-
ganism where the material is well-characterized and contains only non-coding
regulatory regions. ~
The Flavr-Savr was considered a regulated article for purposes of intro-
duction under 7 CFR x 340 because unlike products derived through natural
selective breeding, plant pathogen sources were used in its development. Thus,
Calgene had to apply for a permit to be able to conduct eld testing with
the Flavr-Savr{ that is, to introduce the tomato into the environment through
experimentation.
The procedure for acquiring such a permit for experimentation was quite
lengthy. Application had to be made at least 120 days in advance of the pro-
posed release. 12 In addition, there were extensive informational disclosure
requirements, encompassing
9
10general identication and several detailed reports, including the following:
- a description of the anticipated or actual expression of the altered ge-
netic material in the regulated article and how that expression diers from the
expression in the non-modied parental organism (e.g. morphological or struc-
tural characteristics, physiological activities and processes, number of copies
of inserted genetic material and the physical state of this material inside the
recipient organism (integrated or extrachromosomal), products and secretions,
growth characteristics 13
-a detailed description of the molecular biology of the system. .. which is or
will be used to produce the regulated article14
-a detailed description of the purpose for the introduction
of the regulated article including a detailed description of the proposed ex-
perimental and/or production design15
-a detailed description of the processes, procedures, and safeguards which
have been used or will be used in the country of origin and in the United States
to prevent contamination, release, and dissemination in the production [of the
regulated article]16
-a detailed description of the intended destination. uses and/or distribution
of the regulated article (e.g. greenhouses, laboratory, or growth chamber lo-
cation; eld trial location; pilot project location; production, propagation, and
manufacture location; proposed sale and distributional location)17
-a detailed description of the proposed procedures, processes, and safeguards
which will be used to prevent escape and dissemination of the regulated article
at each of the intended destinations18
As is evident by the extensive procedure outlined above, the USDA made
it relatively dicult for any genetically altered article to gain permission for
introduction through movement and
13 ~ CFR x 340.4(b) (5).
14 ~ CFR x 340.4(b) (6).
15 ~ CFR x 340.4(b) (8).
16 ~ CFR x 340.4(b) (10).
17 ~ CFR x 340.4(b) (11).
18 ~ CFR x 340.4(b) (12).
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11experimentation, let alone for deregulation and marketing. Yet, Calgene
successfully obtained a permit for introduction to conduct eld testing. It then
proceeded to a previously untested step in the USDA regulatory process for
genetically altered plant products{ to attempt to switch from regulated to non-
regulated status.
2. Obtaining Non-Regulatory Status
On July 14, 1992, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
published a notice in the Federal Register stating that Calgene had led a pe-
tition for the Flavr-Savr to assume non-regulated status and requesting com-
ments on a proposed interpretive ruling concerning this petition.19 Calgene had
requested that the Flavr-Savr tomato's status as a regulated article under 7
CFR x 340 be changed, alleging that it did not present a plant pest risk un-
der the Federal Plant Pest Act. A decision to deregulate would mean that
the Flavr-Savr tomato would no longer need permits from APHIS for release
into the environment, importation, or interstate movement, and that any cul-
tivation, propagation, movement, and crossbreeding with other non-regulated
tomato lines could be conducted freely.
On October 19, 1992 (after a comment period of 45 days which had ended
on August 28, 1992), APHIS announced its issuance of the interpretive rul-
ing on Calgene's petition.20 Based upon written comments submitted to the
USDA, a review of scientic literature, expert opinion from tomato breeders
and pathologists, data
19 57 Fed. Reg. 31170 (July 14, 1992)
20 ~ Fed. Reg. 47608 (Oct. 19, 1992)
11
12submitted by Calgene, and the biological and observable properties of the
tomato itself,21 APHIS agreed that the Flavr-Savr would no longer be considered
a regulated article. The scope of the interpretive ruling applied only to the Flavr-
Savr tomato, and only to those Flavr-Savr tomato lines that had already been
eld tested under the auspices of the USDA, so that new tomato lines carrying
dierent marker genes were not included.22
A USDA decision that an organism does not present a plant pest risk signies
that there is reasonable certainty that the organism cannot directly or indirectly
cause disease, injury, or damage when grown, stored, sold, or processed. This
kind of decision requires evaluating the existence of pathogens, weediness, and
harmful eects on benecial organisms. In its interpretive ruling, APHIS came
to ve basic conclusions that would later help set the regulatory standard of
future USDA evaluations for the potential deregulation of genetically altered
agricultural products. These conclusions express the agency's general belief
that there is no reason to fear the possibility of certain genetically altered plants
overrunning or damaging other plants:
1- The Flavr-Savr exhibits no Dlant Dathogenic oroDerties.
First, since the plasmids used in the construction of the Flavr-Savr are dis-
armed, they cannot replicate
21 ~ was only after the deregulation of the Flavr-Savr that the USDA
nalized the process for assuming non-regulated status. This process is
addressed in the 1993 amendments to 7 CER x 340, which are discussed below.
22 Since the Flavr-Savr's regulatory approval, Calgene has submitted and been
cleared for the non-regulation of numerous tomato lines in addition to those few
which were deregulated in 1992. ~ 59 Fed. Reg. 50220 (October 3, 1994), 59
Fed. Reg. 59746 (November 18, 1994), 60 Fed. Reg. 15284 (March 23, 1995),
and 60 Fed. Reg. 38788 (July 28, 1995)
12
13themselves. In addition, the transferred genetic material in the Flavr-Savr
is considered stable; that is, it will not persist in the environment outside of the
direct cultivation process. Third, neither the transferred gene nor the antibiotic
resistance marker gene (the kanamycin resistance gene) in the Flavr-Savr is
likely to cause disease or damage to any other plant.
2- The Flavr-Savr is no more likely to become a weed than non-engineered Darental varieties of the tomato
. In
general, the tomato is a highly domesticated plant that does not persist with-
out human intervention; the FlavrSavr is so similar to the traditional tomato
that it, too, has little potential to become a successful weed.
3- The Flavr-Savr is unlikely to increase the weediness Dotential of any other cultivated or wild Dlant with which the organism can interbreed
. The tomato does not
cross-pollinate with other plants in the United States without human in-
tervention, and commercial tomatoes are virtually self-pollinating, so it is not
likely that the tomato will increase the weedy potential of other plants.
4- The Flavr-Savr does not cause damaae to Drocessec1 agricultural commodities.
Processing the Flavr-Savr
tomato plant should not create increased susceptibility toward disease or
damage.
5- The Flavr-Savr is unlikely to harm other organisms that are benecial to agriculture
. Since no toxic components
13
14or pathogenic properties were located in the Flavr-Savr, there is no reason
to believe that any organisms (such as bees) could be adversely aected by its
existence.
The.1993 Amendments to 7 CFR ~ 340
Partially in response to its regulatory experience with the Flayr-Sayr tomato,
APHIS set forth a proposed rule to amend 7 CFR x 340 in November 1992.23
On March 31, 1993 APHIS published a nal rule regarding this matter;24 this
rule became eective on April 30, 1993. The amendments to 7 CFR x 340 al-
tered USDA regulation of genetically altered products in two basic ways. First,
the USDA instituted a more lenient notication process under x340.3 for the
introduction of six previously regulated types of plants. Thus, the notication
process provided an easier regulatory alternative for corn, tomato, cotton, to-
bacco, soybean, and potato while the traditional, lengthy petition process for
introduction of organisms remained in place for all other crops. Second, based
upon the deregulation of the FlayrSayr, the USDA set out a new petition pro-
cedure for determinations that certain genetically altered agricultural products
would be deregulated.
7 CFR ~340.3: Notication for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Arti-
cles
23 57 Fed. Reg. 53036 (November 6, 1992).
24 58 Fed. Reg. 17044 (March 31, 1993).
14
15The decision to allow six major crops (potato, corn, soybean, tomato, cot-
ton, and tobacco) to be subject only to a notication process instead of to a
mandatory full-blown permit evaluation was based on the USDA's collective ex-
perience (from 1987 to 1993) with genetically altered plants. Within that time,
the USDA granted 365 permits for importation and release into the environment
and
1301 permits for interstate movement for organisms which had been de-
veloped with genetic material from plant pests. Of these permits, 85% were
granted for the six types of plants designated in 7 CFR x 340 as subject to the
new notication process. 25
The USDA's extensive regulatory evaluations of tomato, corn, soybean,
potato, cotton, and tobacco prior to allowing their introduction into the en-
vironment through experimentation and eld testing had conrmed that the
genetically altered versions of these crops presented largely the same ecological
concerns (e.g. weediness, competitiveness, toxicity) as their traditional counter-
parts. The USDA's evaluation of the Flayr-Sayr was cited as support for the new
lenient notication process for experimentation. Determining that the Flavr-
Savr should have non-regulated status provided the USDA with the experience
of assessing the potential for gene transfer from genetically altered, commer-
cially popular plants such as the tomato; as a result, the agency found any such
potential to be negligible. While APHIS expressed receptivity to adding other
species to the six-crop list in the future, it conned its initial list to these
25 ~ 58 Fed. Reg. 17044 (March 31, 1993) . Specically, the percentages of
total permits were issued as follows: corn (19%), cotton (10%), potato (20%),
soybean (18%), tobacco (5%), and tomato (13%)
15
16six crops because they had been the most actively eld tested and thoroughly
considered. The lenient notication process under 7 CFR x 340 only provides for
private experimentation; because the USDA regulates eld testing and requires
that tests only exist under conned, controlled conditions, it seemed logical that
such carefully monitored cultivation would not present increased risk to the
environment and other organisms.26 APHIS also expressed its belief, though,
that experimentation and interstate movement of genetically altered versions of
the six crops would not pose any additional risk to the dissemination of plant
pests.
In order to be eligible for the new notication procedure, genetically altered
agricultural products must meet the following criteria:
1. The article must be one of the six species mentioned above. The
USDA acknowledged that it would be amenable to adding new plant species to
the six species mentioned above when such additions are deemed appropriate in
the future.27
26 ~ would like to note that while the USDA does not have special National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements, it must comply with NEPAs
standard provisions requiring the preparation of environmental evaluations when
major federal action 'signicantly aects the quality of the human environment.
APHIS had prepared individual environmental assessments and ndings of no
signicant impact (FONSI's) for all permit evaluations between 1987 and 1993.
As these inquiries led the USDA to decide that the six crops now qualifying
for the new notication scheme presented no signicant environmental impact,
the USDA anticipated eliminating a need for NEPA environmental evaluations
for these crops on a case-by-case basis in the future. Testing organisms other
than those of the six notication crops are still regulated under traditional
permit procedures, and thus must still comply with the preparation of case-by-
case environmental assessments and environmental impact statements whenever
necessary under the requirements of
NEPA.
27lnterestingly, the USDA's proposed rule for amending 7 CFR x 340 (57 Fed.
Reg. 53036, Nov. 6, 1992) had contemplated the possibility of decentralizing
the decision to add other species to the list by providing for eligibility decisions
at the level of an appropriate' Institutional Biosafety Committee.
16
172. The introduced genetic material is stably integrated{ that is, that
it cannot replicate itself.
3. The function of the genetic material is known, and does not cause
plant disease.
4. The introduced genetic material does not cause the production of
infectious entities, encode substances that are likely to be toxic to other organ-
isms, or encode products intended for pharmaceutical use. These are all serious
consequences that should not be ignored with a lenient notication process.
5. The genetic sequences used must not pose a signicant risk of the
creation of any new plant virus.
6. The plant cannot contain certain genetic material derived from
human or animal pathogens. 28
Furthermore, the notication process under 7 CFR x 340.3 incorporates per-
formance standards. These standards, which are similar to those required for
the traditional permit process,
The USDA removed this provision from the nal rule in response to com-
ments that such a committee (and various state authorities, for that matter),
lacked the expertise to make such determinations that such a provision would
amount to self-regulation by researchers, and that the proposed committee
would have no public accountability for its actions. The authority to add new
species to the six crops mentioned in the nal rule, then, now remains with
APHIS for public accountability, consistency, and liability purposes. See, 59
Fed. Reg. 17044. (March 31, 1993).
28APH15 specically noted that it was not purporting to infringe upon existing
federal authority (i.e. FDA, EPA) through the regulation of pathogens, but
that this requirement was necessary to enable the USDA to oversee the intro-
duction of plants containing any genetic material that has never been expressed
in plants before.
17
18provide additional guarantees against adverse eects on the environment
due to gene transfer from the six plant species to other plants. For example,
regulated articles must be adequately contained so they will not be released into
the environment, and they must not be mixed inadvertently with non-regulated
plants that are not part of the approved environmental release. In addition, all
eld trials must be conducted so that the regulated article will not persist in
the environment without human intervention.
Procedurally, the notication process for the six specied crops is much less
rigorous than the traditional permit process. The USDA requires only basic
identication and general information about the imminent introduction of the
plant, including the source of the genetic material, the method by which the
recipient organism was transformed, the size and location of the introduction,
and a statement certifying that introducing the regulated article will be in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the applicable sections of the 7 CFR x 34Q29
Notifying the USDA only has to be accomplished thirty days prior to the impor-
tation or environmental release of the product (in comparison with the 120 day
requirement of the traditional permit process), and ten days prior to the day
of an interstate movement.30 Finally, eld test reports must be submitted to
the USDA every year during the occurrence of the eld tests, and any unusual
occurrences must be reported immediately. These data reports were perceived
by the
297 CFR x 340.3(d).
301n fact, the proposed USDA rule suggested ~ notication as introduction,
but concern about public perception and the need for review on the state level
prompted the agency to change its mind!
18
19USDA as not only being crucial to safety, but also as essential for step two
in the USDA's regulatory regime{ evaluations to determine the potential for
switching a product from regulated to non-regulated status.
7 CFR p340.6: Petition for the Determination of Nonregulated Status
Because the USDA projected imminent growth in the development of genet-
ically altered plants, clarifying the petition process for all determinations that
regulated plants should assume non-regulated status was a natural choice for the
second major 1993 amendment to 7 CFR x 340. The USDA chose to formalize
a procedure similar to that which it had used for the rst genetically altered
crops considered by the agency; it basically codied the same evaluation process
which the Flayr-Sayr went through. In fact, the issues which the USDA decided
to consider with regard to all decisions for nonregulatory status under 7 CFR
x 340.6 (c) (4) were derived from the ve conclusions which were articulated
in the Flavr-Savr's interpretive ruling for non-regulated status. According to 7
CFR 340.6(c) (4), this includes (but is not limited to)
plant pest risk characteristics, disease and pest susceptibilities, expression of
the gene product, new enzymes or changes to the plant metabolism, weediness
of the regulated article, impact on the weediness of any other plant with which
it can interbreed, agricultural or cultivation practices, eects of the regulated
article on nontarget organisms, indirect plant pest eects on other agricultural
products, transfer of genetic information to organisms with which it cannot
interbreed, and any other information which the Director believes to be relevant
to a determination. Any information known to the petitioner that indicates that
a regulated article may pose a greater plant pest
19
20risk than the unmodied recipient organism shall also be included.
Furthermore, APHIS requires all available experimental data, scientic liter-
ature and publications, unpublished studies, and a description of the dierences
in genotype between the regulated article and the nonmodied recipient organ-
ism. 31 Finally, APHIS extended the 45 day public comment period to 80 days,
and the 120 day review period to 180 days in order to accommodate public
concern and to provide an opportunity for response from the public, the indus-
try, and the scientic community. Based upon the existence of such extensive
informational requirements, it is evident that the process for attaining non-
regulated status was meant to be quite comprehensive. Perhaps close scrutiny
was deemed important at the nal stage of regulatory checks in order to com-
pensate for leniency in granting permits for experimentation and eld testing
through notication. The Flavr-Savr went through fairly rigorous analysis; sim-
ilarly, the USDA seemed to anticipate a thorough evaluation of all genetically
altered products. The major step taken in the 1993 amendments was, however,
that for six crops, thorough evaluation would no longer be required at every
regulatory step{ such scrutiny was reserved instead for the deregulation stage.
Section II: The FDA and the Flavr-Savr Tomato
Sta tu tory Au thori t~
The Food and Drug Administration is the primary federal agency responsible
for ensuring the safety of commercial food and
31 ~ CFR x 340.6(c)
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21food additives. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA
has broad authority to ensure the safety and wholesomeness of food. Under
section 402(a) (1) of that act, a food is deemed adulterated and unlawful if:
it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render
it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added substance such
food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of such
substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health.
If producers of food are careful to ensure that food is safe, FDA enforce-
ment mechanisms under this provision do not come into play, as the agency
relies primarily on postmarket review and not on premarket evaluations of food
products.
In contrast, however, under section 409(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, food additives are deemed to be unsafe unless premarket approval
is given by the FDA. Congress provided for a premarket approval requirement
in evaluating additives, with a science-based safety standard by which one must
demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from the intended
use of the additive. Once this standard is met, FDA regulations specify the
conditions under which the additive may be safely used. The food additive
rules do provide an exception to mandatory premarket review, however, as if
substances are generally recognized as safe (GRAS) they are excluded from the
denition of food additives, and are thus not subject to premarket review. A
substance is considered GRAS if its safety has been recognized through a long
history of use in food or if information available regarding the substance shows
no danger of a
21
22safety concern necessitating premarket review. The FDA recommends con-
sulting with the FDA to determine whether a substance is GRAS.
Producers of new foods are obligated to independently ensure that the foods
they enter into the marketplace are safe. Since the FDA is empowered un-
der the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to initiate ex post legal action
through seizure, injunction, and criminal prosecution against any food found
to be adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of the Act, however, food
manufacturers often consult with the FDA concerning potential safety and reg-
ulatory issues. This is especially true with regard to new food products which
are produced using innovative methods and new technology (such as the use of
biotechnology for creating genetically engineered foods). Although such consul-
tations are optional, the FDA encourages them in order to reduce the danger of
potentially adverse impacts on human and animal food safety. Calgene actively
sought FDA evaluation of the Flayr-Sayr tomato as a protective measure before
introducing its product into the market.
The Flayr-Sayr and the FDA
Calgene's requests that the FDA evaluate the Flayr-Sayr tomato marked
the rst involvement the FDA had with foods produced through the use of new
methods of gene transfer. Calgene rst contacted the FDA regarding the Flayr-
Sayr by ling two petitions. In the rst petition, Calgene asked for an advisory
opinion concerning whether the Flayr-Sayr would be classied as
22
23food and treated the same as traditional tomato varieties. 32 In the sec-
ond petition, Calgene requested an advisory opinion regarding whether the
kanamycin resistance gene, the selectable marker gene used in the production
of several genetically altered foods including the Flayr-Sayr, could be evaluated
by the FDA for use. ~ After the FDA released a policy statement on foods de-
rived from new plant varieties in 1992 (discussed below), Calgene resubmitted
its petition regarding the kanamycin resistance gene in light of its potential to
be considered a food additive. It revised its previous request and asked instead
that the food additive regulations be amended to provide for the safe use of the
kanamycin resistance gene as a processing aid. ~
In May 1994, the FDA published responses to both of Calgene's requests.
First, the FDA concluded that the Flavr-Savr has not been signicantly altered
when compared to varieties of tomatoes with a history of safe use, and that it
could therefore be considered food and treated the same as traditional tomato
varieties.35 This decision was made after the FDA evaluated the Flavr-Savr in
light of the factors indicated in the FDA's policy statement of 1992. Second,
the FDA decided to amend the food additive regulations to provide for the safe
use of the kanamycin resistance gene as a processing aid for developing new
varieties
32 57 Fed. Reg. 22772 (May 29, 1992)
See 56 Fed. Reg. 20004 (May 1, 1991). The kanamycin resistance gene is
used to mark the specic genes that determine desired traits, thus aiding in the
development of genetically altered foods with narrowly dened genetic changes.
Since the marker gene persists in low levels in foods derived from the genetically
altered plants (it would add very small amounts of a new protein to the diets of
the consumers of the product), Calgene brought the substance to the attention
of the FDA.
58 Fed. Reg. 38429 (July 16, 1993)
59 Fed. Reg. 26647 (May 23, 1994)
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24of tomato, oilseed rape, and cotton. 36 This decision was based upon review-
ing data submitted by Calgene and upon the results of a meeting of the FDA'S
Food Advisory Committee in April 1994 (along with outside consultants rep-
resenting various scientic disciplines). This meeting addressed the kanamycin
resistance gene in particular and the FDA approach to evaluating the safety of
foods in general, using the Flayr-Sayr tomato as an example as the focus of the
meeting.
The FDA came to several conclusions regarding the kanamycin resistance
gene. With regard to its safety for digestion, Calgene proved that the enzyme
is inactivated by stomach acid and degraded by digestive enzymes, that it is
not toxic, and that its estimated dietary exposure would be extremely low.
In addition, the FDA determined that exposing processed food products to
high temperatures would denature any enzymes which could have an adverse
impact on the therapeutic eectiveness of antibiotics. Also, in unprocessed,
fresh foods the enzyme would be degraded enough through digestion to prevent
any problems. The FDA stated that other selectable marker genes (for uses
similar to that which the kanamycin resistance gene serves) would be evaluated
on a case by case basis.
Through its evaluation of the Flayr-Sayr, the FDA was able to glean enough
experience to develop a workable regulatory system by which the food products
of genetically altered plants could be analyzed and approved for sale in the
market. The FDA's attention
36 59 Fed. Reg. 26700 (May 23, 1994) . Specically, the FDA approved the
use of the protein APH(3 minutes) II that is synthesized upon direction of the
kanarnycin resistance gene.
24
25to the Flavr-Savr and the Flavr-Savr's role in setting a market precedent
helped enable the agency to publish a policy statement addressing the future
regulation of genetically altered foods. Had the policy statement not been pub-
lished, it seemed likely that other genetically altered foods would follow the path
of the Flavr-Savr and seek out comprehensive analysis and approval. Instead,
the FDA articulated a position that foods derived from new plant varieties
would not have to pass through the extensive regulatory hurdles through which
the Flayr-Sayr traveled.
FDA Policy Statement of 1992
Because the FDA had received inquiries from industry, government agen-
cies, academia, and the public requesting an authoritative articulation of the
regulatory status of genetically altered foods, the FDA published a policy state-
ment on foods derived from new plant varieties in May 1992. ~ This policy
statement interprets the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect
to the use of biotechnology in the production of food, and was an attempt to
resolve regulatory issues prior to the widespread introduction of genetically al-
tered foods into the marketplace. It addresses the potential need for premarket
review, agency jurisdiction, informational requirements, and labeling; thus, the
policy statement is an invaluable tool in analyzing the FDA's positions with
respect to genetically altered foods. The views taken by the FDA with regard
to genetically altered foods had contributed to the agency's decision to support
57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992)
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26the entry of the Flavr-Savr into the marketplace.38 An overview of the most
signicant aspects of the policy statement follow.
The 1992 policy statement emphasizes that FDA regulation of food is mainly
concerned with the objective characteristics and the intended use of food prod-
ucts, and not necessarily with the method by which a food is developed (though
studying methodology may sometimes contribute to a complete understand-
ing of the characteristics of a food product). Thus, merely because a food is
genetically altered is not automatic cause for regulatory worry; the FDA is gen-
erally concerned with the nature of nishec9 foods. Consequently, the policy
statement essentially stands for the proposition that traditional regulatory pro-
cedures under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act should remain the
primary legal mechanisms to ensure the safety of foods derived from genetically
modifying processes. The FDA deemed its existing statutory authority and reg-
ulatory scheme to be adequate to ensure the safety of foods derived form new
plant varieties, noting:
The existing tools. .. impose a clear legal duty on producers to assure the
safety of foods they oer to consumers; this legal duty is backed up by strong
enforcement powers, and FDA has authority to require premarket review and
approval in cases where such review is required to protect public health.
This interpretation is fairly lenient towards genetically altered foods, which,
according to the policy statement, are held to the
38 Because calgene made its evaluation requests prior to the nalization of
the policy statement, it was forced to use lengthy, standard requests for advi-
sory opinions under 21 CFR 10.85 (notice and comment regulatory procedures)
instead of using the recommendations set forth in the policy statement. In the
1992 statement, the FDA instructed all future requests for FDA consultation to
be made consistent with the streamlined procedures and principles articulated
in the policy statement. It is likely, however, that the FDA's determinations in
the policy statement impacted its ultimate evaluation of the Flavr-Savr.
3957 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992), p. 163.
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27same general standards as traditional foods, and thus are not considered to
be more dangerous or to require unusually stringent evaluation.
Traditional FDA regulation is primarily found under section 402(a) (1) of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act regulating the sale of foods that con-
tain unacceptable levels of unintended and unexpected contaminants (including
naturally occurring toxicants), and section 409 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, providing for the premarket review of all food additives not recog-
nized as GRAS. While the FDA emphasized its continued authority to exercise
premarket review and to use its enforcement powers under these two main food
safety provisions, the agency doubted that foods derived from genetically engi-
neered plants would present safety concerns. First, the FDA rejected the need
for regulating genetically altered foods under section 402(a) (1) of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. While the FDA set forth a set of considerations
which producers should use before introducing foods derived from new plant
varieties into the marketplace (described below), ultimate decisions to market
genetically altered food products are left to the producers, subject to FDA
postmarket enforcement powers. Postmarket accountability was considered to
be sucient incentive for producers to maintain the high safety standards which
characterize the U.S. food supply.
Second, the FDA evaluated the application of section 409 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Since most food additives can only be used
after premarket authorization, one
27
28could theoretically see this requirement as a vehicle through which all genet-
ically altered foods deemed to contain food additives could be forced through
close scrutiny by the FDA. Section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act denes food additive as:
any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be ex-
pected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise
aecting the characteristics of any food. .. if such substance is not generally rec-
ognized among experts. .. as having been adequately shown through scientic
procedures. .. to be safe under the conditions of its intended use.
In the policy statement, the FDA left open the Dossibility that transferred
genetic material and the intended expression products (thus excluding unex-
pected or naturally occurring toxins) could potentially be subject to premarket
review as food additives. However, the agency expressed doubt that added ge-
netic material could present major food additive concerns, as the nucleic acids
that are the major tools in genetic alteration of food are already universally
present in living things{ including every plant and animal used for food by hu-
mans or animals. Thus, such substances would most likely be considered GRAS,
not likely to raise safety concerns, and not subject to premarket approval. The
policy statement states:
When the substance present in the food is one that is already present at
generally comparable or greater levels in currently consumed foods, there is
unlikely to be a safety question sucient to call into question the presumed
GRAS status of such naturally occurring substances and thus warrant formal
premarket review and approval by FDA. Likewise, minor variations in molecular
structure that do not aect safety would not ordinarily aect the GRAS status
of the substances and, thus,
28
29would not ordinarily require regulation of the substance as a food additive
40
The FDA, then, anticipated food additive concern as only likely to arise when
new substances are injected into plants and consequently manifest themselves
in the resulting food products.
Since phenotypic eects of any new trait are not always immediately and
completely predictable, however, the FDA advised some level of consultation
with the agency in order to assure that food products derived from new plant
varieties would be analyzed for potentially adverse characteristics.. This is es-
pecially important when one considers that genetic alteration techniques such
as the recombinant DNA technique used to create the FlayrSavr tomato have
the ability to aect both what the FDA calls the agronomic traits (aecting
such elements as disease resistance, insects and herbicides, and the ability to
exist under certain environmental conditions) and quality traits (aecting such
elements as processing, preservation, nutrition, and avor of plants).
Though the FDA expressed a belief that the likelihood of safety hazards
arising from genetic modication techniques would be very slim, the policy
statement articulated the following eight potential eects which may require
agency evaluation in order to assure food safety:
1. Unexpected eects. Unanticipated mutations can have an ad-
verse eect on food products. However, the FDA expressed condence that
plant breeders using
40 57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992)
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30established scientic practices have successfully identied and eliminated
plants that exhibit unexpected, adverse traits prior to commercial use.
2. Known Toxicants. Many foods contain naturally occurring toxins
that have the potential to be dangerous when they occur at high levels. The
FDA expressed concern over the possibility that new plants can produce foods
with high toxin levels. However, the FDA stated that plants with a long history
of use that have not been associated with unusual toxicant characteristics are
unlikely to present problems, because if toxicants do not present diculties
in parent plants, it is improbable that they will arise in genetically modied
versions.
3. NutrientS. The level of nutrients may be altered through genetic
modication, aecting the potential nutrition of resulting foods.
4. New Substances. Genetic engineers can introduce any substance
into plants{ even substances that would never occur naturally{ and such sub-
stances should be evaluated for safety.
5. ~ If genes are extracted from common food allergens and trans-
ferred into non-allergenic plants, this may result in foods with allergenic prop-
erties. Thus, labeling foods containing known or suspected allergens may be
necessary.
6. Antibiotic Resistance Selectable Markers. Selectable marker genes
are used to isolate particular genes for
30
31particular traits, and persist in the eventual food products derived from ge-
netically altered plants. The theoretical possibility exists that some of these
marker genes could inactivate commonly used antibiotics when used for thera-
peutic reasons by humans.41
7. Plants DeveloDed to Make Nonfood Substances. such ~s Polymers and Pharmaceuticals.
The FDA wants to insure that non-food uses are not mixed or cross-bred with
food uses. Nonfood chemicals that nd their way into food products are con-
sidered a potential source of adulteration.
8. Animal Feed Issues. Since animals consume parts of plants that
humans do not, and since the composition of animal diets is not as diverse as
those of humans, any alteration in animal feed composition can be signicant.
Because of the above eight concerns, the FDA articulated several considera-
tions for the biotechnology industry to keep in mind as new food products are
developed and compared with their traditional counterparts: 42
1. Characteristic toxicants of the host and donor species
2. The potential for allergen transfer
41 Note, however, that calgenes selectable marker, the kanamycin resistance
gene, was approved for use pursuant FDA evaluation, and the food additive
regulations were amended to provide for such use in 1994 (59 Fed. Reg. 26700,
May 23, 1994). This issue is discussed in the next section, below.
42 The policy statement also contains a complex ow chart to be used by in-
dustry in evaluating and testing their products. ~, 57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May
29, 1992)
31
323. The concentration of nutrients
4. The safety and nutritional value of added proteins
5. The identity, composition, and nutritional value of carbohydrates,
fats, and oils.
6. The eects of processing
7. The characteristics of the host plant and the donor plant
8. Metabolic considerations
9. Stability of the new plant variety. Food safety cannot be assured
if genetic material is expressed at dierent levels in dierent generations.
The other issue addressed by the FDA in the policy statement was labeling.
~ According to section 403(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, food
products must be described by its common or usual name (or an appropriately
descriptive term), and reveal all material facts in light of representations sug-
gested by labels. The FDA stated that foods derived from new plant varieties
must be labeled only if they dier from [their] traditional counterparts such that
the common or usual name no longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or
usage issue exists to which consumers must be alerted. ~ The agency did not
43 I should also note that the FDA considered the applicability of NEPA
to the regulation and use of foods derived from new plant varieties. Because
the FDA anticipated that other agencies (for example, the USDA) may prepare
environmental documentation, it expressed a desire to tier its environmental
statements with those of other agencies in order to eliminate redundancy and
repetition of similar issues. It intended to consult with APHIS whenever APHIS
receives a petition for determination of regulatory status. However, the FDA
does not consider safety consultations and regulatory advice regarding new foods
to be agency action within the realm of NEPA requirements.
~ 57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992) . The FDA cited the example of
a tomato having a peanut protein, as such protein may cause an allergic reaction
and should thus be included on the tomato's label.
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33determine, however, whether labeling should be required to distinguish all
foods that were developed using genetic engineering techniques, as it was yet
unclear whether the methods to develop such new plant varieties should be
considered material and thus necessary information for labels. (The issue of
labeling will be further addressed in Section III).
The policy statement, by articulating potential concerns that may arise in
genetically altered foods, provided a solid framework by which foods derived
from new plant varieties could move through FDA regulatory channels. The
Flavr-Savr spurred the agency to set forth its positions, as it paved the way for
other foods to seek entry into the market. The FDA seemed to back away from
any commitments of thorough agency evaluation; however, it provided guidelines
by which producers of novel foods could address major agency concerns.
Section III: Analysis of Present and Future Regulation
Frameworks for Analysis
In June 1986, the Oce of Science and Technology Policy published a Coor-
dinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology. '~'~ It designated the
general scope of the various governmental regulatory agencies in the realm of
biotechnology research. The Coordinated Framework states:
the agencies will seek to operate their programs in an integrated and coor-
dinated fashion and together should cover the full range of plants, animals, and
microorganisms derived by the
51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986)
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34new genetic engineering techniques. To the extent possible, responsibility
for a product use will lie with a single agency 46
While the Coordinated Framework anticipated that genetically engineered
products could be reviewed by the FDA for food uses, by the USDA for plant
pests and animal pathogens, and by the EPA for pesticides according to each
agency's traditional approval regimens, it also foresaw the possibility for over-
lapping jurisdiction, and left open the potential for the regulatory framework
to evolve in light of experience.
In February 1992, the Oce of Science and Technology published another
guide for regulatory agencies. ~ It outlined a risk-based approach to be used
by agencies in their evaluations of genetically altered products. Essentially, this
document states that extensive evaluation should not be undertaken unless in-
formation concerning the risk posed by the introduction indicates that oversight
is necessary. It recommends focusing on the characteristics and risks posed by
nished products instead of concentrating on the process by which such products
are created. This approach is based on the assumption that genetically modied
products will not substantially dier from traditional products, so that strin-
gent evaluation is not necessarily imperative. This risk based approach would
seem to provide for eliminating unreasonable risk while keeping regulatory costs
down and avoiding unnecessary evaluations.
46 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (June 26,1986).
57 Fed. Reg. 6753 (Feb. 27, 1992)
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35These two frameworks for agency action raise interesting issues regarding
the past, present, and future regulatory schemes subscribed to by the USDA
and the FDA. For example, do the current USDA and FDA processes t the
general recommendations of the Oce of Science and Technology? Are the
agencies doing a good job of eliminating redundancy? What are the prospects
for the future of the regulations for genetically altered products? Section III
will address these and other issues raised in the regulation of the Flayr-Sayr and
other genetically altered plants and foods.
A Trend Toward Relaxing Re~ulatorv Resoonsibility
It is apparent that the regulation of genetically altered food products bridges
the jurisdictions of the USDA and the FDA. The USDA primarily concerns it-
self with the agricultural aspect of biotechnology, the FDA with the nished
food; however, since every food product is inextricably linked to the plant that
bears it, each agency has similar basic concerns and can evaluate very similar
data to come to its respective regulatory decisions. For example, both agencies
are concerned with the unanticipated eects of genetically altered products, the
existence of toxins, and the existence of nonfood substances in newly genetically
altered plants and foods. Both the USDA and the FDA must study the sources
of genetically altered plants and foods, and the nature and eects of the trans-
ferred genetic material. With this in mind, it might at rst seem logical to let
one agency take on more of the regulatory responsibility in this area to avoid
35
36redundant regulation. The FDA has essentially left most regulation in the
hands of the USDA, as the FDA accepts mere notication that genetically al-
tered foods are entering the market, and does not require even the kind of
optional premarket evaluation that was performed for the Flayr-Sayr. While
this results in important reduced costs for the FDA in the face of budget con-
straints and limited resources (as manufacturers may expend their own resources
by assessing the safety of their own food products prior to marketing), this also
results in less stringent FDA regulation. It is uncertain, however, whether a
move toward minimal regulation is a wise move to make at such an early stage
in the regulation and marketing of genetically altered plant and food products.
While the pressures of limited resources and budget constraints are real threats
to the FDA's capabilities, the eld of biotechnology is too new for relaxed FDA
evaluation{especially because the USDA also seems to be following a trend to-
ward more streamlined, more lenient regulation.
As was discussed in Section I, the USDA has already moved away from
applying an extensive permit requirement for introducing genetically altered
organisms into the environment and toward a more lenient system of notication
for six crops. The notication program for eld trials of genetically engineered
plants may be about to become further streamlined, however. On August 22,
1995, the USDA published a proposed rule in the Federal Register which would
further amend 7 CFR x340. The eect of the proposed amendments would
be to simplify procedures for the introduction of certain genetically engineered
organisms,
36
37requirements for certain determinations of nonregulated status, and proce-
dures for the reporting of eld tests conducted under notication. 48 The USDA
has articulated several potential amendments to the currently used procedures:
1. Extending Easy Notication. The notication process for intro-
ductions of genetically altered products into the environment would be extended
to plant types beyond the six plant types now designated for notication in 7
CFR x 340.3. APHIS proposes to allow lenient notication for the eld tests of
nearly all genetically engineered crops, asserting that there is no technical rea-
son to treat some crop categories dierently from others. The only requirements
would be that certain eligibility criteria and performance standards are met. '~
Thus, any plant species not listed by the agency as a noxious weed would be
allowed to be introduced into the environment.
2. Reduced eld test reDortinQ reauirements. Instead of requesting
annual data reports, APHIS would only require that testing results which are
unexpected or adverse are reported to the agency.
~ 60 Fed. Reg. 43567 (August 22, 1995)
~ Remember that the USDA showed its proclivity toward leniency
in this area early on by originally proposing to decentralize all decisions to add
plant types to the notication list. The proposed amendments to 7 CFR x 340
(57 Fed. Reg. 53036, Nov. 6, 1992) had originally provided for eligibility for
plants once consultation with an appropriate Institutional Biosafety committee
was conducted. See above discussion of the amendments to 7 CFR x
340.
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38(Recordkeeping requirements would remain thorough, as currently provided
in 7 CFR x340.).
3. Extending determinations of nonreaulated status to Dlants related to antecedent organisms.
Regulated articles that are closely related to an organism for which a determina-
tion of nonregulated status has already been made will easily be able to attain
nonregulated status. Thus, as bioengineered plants with similar traits to those
already approved for nonregulated status continue to seek USDA approval, the
list of nonregulated plants will grow.
4. Publishing guidelines. APHIS will publish general guidelines for
eld trials of the new products of agricultural biotechnology, including infor-
mation regarding procedures, methods, scientic principles, and other factors.
Any developer may consult APHIS to verify procedures, practices, or protocols
to be used.
Possible Eects of Relaxed Regulation
Reducing regulatory hurdles for plant introduction seems to conform to the
Oce of Science and Technology's risk-based approach that is outlined above,
as a lenient notication process allows the USDA to focus more on the char-
acteristics and risks posed by nished products than on organism introduction
and the methods by which such products are created, which do not in
38
39themselves seem to pose a great degree of risk. However, less stringent
permit requirements present a danger of problematic eects{ most notably that
the number of applications for non-regulated status may signicantly increase,
and that wholesale deregulation of genetically altered food products may not
adequately account for the potential to transfer genes to wild relatives.
One of the eects of the notication procedure is that the cost associated
with permit preparation is reduced by 95%. 50 When one considers, however,
that the number of existing notications and introduction permit approvals is
already substantial (since 1987, for example, over 560 eld test permits have
been issued, including 39 dierent plant species, and APHIS has reviewed and
acknowledged over 900 notications for the 6 originally designated crops), re-
duced cost associated with USDA notication makes it extremely likely that a
sharp upward trend in the number of notications and introductions of genet-
ically altered organism will be sparked. ~ A notication system enables (and
arguably encourages) more widespread biotechnology experimentation, opening
up genetic engineering of food to both large and small actors and providing the
opportunity for many experiments to be conducted with minimal regulation. 52
Under the proposed rule, it is
~ The industry would save approximately $50,000 in costs associated
with
preparing submissions to APHIS. ~, 60 Fed. Reg. 43567 (August 22, 1995).
51 APHIS recognizes that if its simplied procedures for genetically engi-
neered plants are put into place, there will be growth in experimentation
- but it anticipates only positive eects, such as an increase in agri-
cultural production and a broadening of international trade. The agency also
acknowledges that developing researchers would benet under the new scheme.
~ 60 Fed. Reg. 43567, 43571 (August 22, 1995)
52 I should note that the converse is also problematic. If regulation is .~
stringent, the development of genetically engineered products may be crippled.
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40anticipated that 99% of all eld trials would be conducted under notication
procedures, and that determinations to grant nonregulated status would take
one-fourth of the time now required.
As long as experimentation is conducted responsibly and carefully, this alone
does not pose a problem. After all, the goal of regulation is not to stie research
and development{especially in the potentially benecial, new eld of biotechnol-
ogy. However, a sharp increase in the number of introductions will logically yield
an increase in the number of requests to switch from regulated to nonregulated
status, as the hundreds of biotechnological research projects currently under-
way will begin to seek entry into the marketplace for eld tested products. It is
questionable whether the USDA will have the resources or the experience with
genetically altered plants to comfortably accommodate all of these requests.
Thus, while the process for assuming non-regulated status is theoretically suf-
ciently comprehensive to compensate for any leniency in allowing genetically
altered products to be introduced through a notication process, the danger ex-
ists that the procedure for obtaining non-regulatory status will not be workable
in reality.
Two potentially undesirable eects could follow if the USDA is swamped
with regulatory requests. Either the agency will be
For example, with extensive review by the USDA for plant and agricultural
characteristics, the FDA for food characteristics, and the EPA for insecticidal
properties, one could envision a burdensome, expensive process which would
be a huge disincentive to companies wishing to develop genetically engineered
products. Furthermore, such a process would benet large, richer companies at
the expense of smaller, more entrepreneurial biotech companies. A regulatory
position assuming a middle ground is obviously in order.
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41clogged with work, or the regulations will become even further lenient. Not
only does the USDA not necessarily have the capability or desire to evaluate
every product as extensively as it was able to do with the Flayr-Sayr, but it also
will not be likely to halt the advent of genetically altered agricultural products
by scrutinizing each new proposal and causing extensive delay through backlog.
One obvious solution to this danger would, then, seem to be the kind of mass
USDA approval process for genetically engineered crops that is set forth in
the USDA's proposed rule, as me-too kinds of crops may be placed under an
extremely simplied review process.
When the USDA instituted its lenient notication process for tomato, cotton,
tobacco, corn, potato, and soybean, it emphasized that the USDA's responsibil-
ity under the Federal Plant Pest Act and the Plant Quarantine Act is to protect
agriculture and the environment against the introduction and dissemination of
plant pests, and that this is completely separate from commercialization and
marketing concerns, which are left to state laws, the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. The
USDA's role is evidently only one in a chain of potential regulation, and should
~ the actions of other entities with discrete responsibilities regarding genetically
altered foods, such as the FDA and state authorities.
There are several potential dangers that could result from relaxing the reg-
ulations and evaluations of genetically engineered products. The greatest po-
tential danger lies in the possibility (and arguably, probability), that the FDA
and individual states
41
42will not elect to institute their own comprehensive evaluative methods for
genetically altered products. If this is the situation, and each entity assumes
that the other will act when in fact none of them are undertaking strict evalua-
tions, the result may be too many genetically altered foods hitting the market
too soon. Every step in introducing genetically altered products into the mar-
ketplace (from interstate movement and experimentation to commercialization
and marketing), will then be leniently regulated by each organization or entity
with a voice in the regulatory process.
Second, just because a plant type is approved for notication does not mean
that it carries with it no degree of risk. While the Oce of Science and Tech-
nology's risk-based evaluation dictates that it is the nished food product that
matters, there is a danger that more lenient regulations could result in approval
based not even on the ultimate characteristics of the genetically altered food,
but on the nature of the traditional,.unaltered version of the food (e.g. general
approval of all genetically altered tomatoes because normal tomatoes are safe).
Through biotechnology, however, one has the ability to radically change the na-
ture of a common food. While products may look alike, after genetic alteration
they can have vastly dierent compositions and manifest their traits very dier-
ently. For example, there are a variety of genetically altered tomatoes that have
recently been approved or are currently going through regulation; yet, while
they all look like tomatoes and taste like tomatoes, they are not all necessarily
just like the Flavr-Savr.
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43DNAP Plant Technology has marketed a tomato with a three ~i~n~h shelf
life by isolating the gene that serves as the master switch for ethylene, copying
it and reinserting it. Monsanto's genetically altered tomato was developed not
only for its extended shelf life, but also to withstand longer travel time. It
contains a gene from a soil bacterium used to slow the tomato's production of
ethylene. The agencies must keep in mind that there are no predictable bounds
to the extent of genetic engineering; every altered product should really be
evaluated on its own merit to insure that nontraditional, genetically engineered
foods do not have nontraditional eects.
Third, consumers may perceive the existence of genetically altered foods
on supermarket shelves as an indication that such foods have been thoroughly
tested and approved by regulatory agencies, and thus be more trusting of prod-
ucts that may not in acutality have gone through stringent regulation. It is
undoubtedly important to have armative agency approval. Early on, industry
expressed the need for strong but appropriate oversight by Federal agencies to
ensure public condence in foods produced by. .. new techniques; this was one of
the reasons the FDA published its policy statement on foods derived from new
plant varieties to begin with. ~ Since genetically altered foods are at the center
of public concern in the food industry, consumers may falsely assume that all
such foods are being strictly regulated. People have more faith in products that
have been authorized by the FDA; for example, initial skepticism regarding the
Flayr-Sayr
57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (May 29. 1992)
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44largely disappeared once consumers discovered that the FDA had deemed the
tomatoes safe for consumption. ~ Furthermore, it would not only be misleading
to the public to have only postmarket regulation of genetically altered foods, but
public receptivity to such foods could be damaged without armative agency
approval.
Fourth, mistakes can happen. Any new product or discipline initially re-
quires more comprehensive monitoring; only when a product passes the tests of
time can relaxing standards be considered a wise action. Even seemingly com-
mon agricultural products that actually do go through extensive regulation can
have unanticipated eects. For example, in 1970, 15% of the national corn crop
was wiped out by a pathogen because more than three-fourths of the United
States' corn acreage was planted with a new hybrid corn seed, and the scientists
who derived the seed had not realized that the gene aecting reproduction also
inuenced susceptibility to fungi. ~ The USDA and the FDA should stringently
evaluate genetically altered products until they truly are proven through use
and experience.
A Potential Tool: The Adyisability of Labeling
Imposing labeling requirements has been proposed as a means of avoiding
extensive agency involvement in the review process while still providing a way to
maintain governmental interest in genetically altered foods through controlling
how such products
It's Food, Jim, But Not as We Know It. Suner Marketing, November 4,
1994.
~ 'Promise, Menace of Biotech create Sharp Debate. San Diego Union
~ Sept. 29, 1994.
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45are marketed. This debate has perhaps been most clearly highlighted by the
current experience with Bovine Growth Hormone and Bovine Somatotropin in
the dairy industry. 56 The issues raised by Bovine Growth Hormone provide
a framework from which the labeling of genetically engineered foods in general
may be discussed.
Bovine Growth Hormone is a genetically engineered copy of a cow hormone
which, when injected into cows, increases their milk production. All milk con-
tains natural BGH; however, when recombinant BGH (rBGH) is injected into
cows, traces of it are found in milk. The approval of rBGH in 1994 stirred up a
urry of concerns regarding the regulation of rBGH, the potential for requiring
labels on all products which contain rBGH, and the ability of those products
which are rBGH-free to have such information on their labels. Vermont was
the rst state to require the identication of products containing rBGH (it will
require signs or shelf stickers for such foods), and it is probable that other states
will follow its lead. On the federal level, the USDA and the FDA have both
become involved in the debate surrounding rBGH. The USDA has stated that
milk from BGHtreated cows is not dierent than the milk from untreated cows.
The FDA published a statement that the FDA has no authority to ban truthful
and not misleading statements on labels, thus allowing products to claim they
are BGH-free (though not reauirin~ labels).
56 Bovine Growth Hormone and Bovine Somatotropin are essentially the
same substances. Both can be produced through the use of recombinant tech-
niques and are abbreviated as rBGH and rBST, respectively.
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46Those who support labeling cite several reasons for their stance{ many of
which parallel objections made regarding the general existence and use of ge-
netically altered foods (see Section I){ but anxiety generally stems from fear of
the eects of ingesting synthetic matter on a regular basis. Through the use of
rBGH, humans ingest higher than normal levels of BGH. Also, rBGH injections
have caused health problems in cows. Furthermore, some argue that the pub-
lic has a right to know which products are genetically altered, and that such
information should not be hidden from them.
The FDA, however, has not embraced the idea of labeling genetically en-
gineered foods, as the agency has not found characteristics of genetically en-
gineered foods to universally dier from foods developed by other breeding
methods to the extent that labeling would be necessary.57 The FDA policy
on labeling, which was explained in the FDA's 1992 policy statement on genet-
ically altered foods, requires labeling only if a food derived from a new plant
variety diers from its traditional counterpart such that the common or usual
name no longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or usage issue exists to
which consumers must be alerted. Products using traditional plant breeding
techniques are not subject to labeling requirements despite being modied with
techniques such as hybridization and
57The United States is not the only country with labeling concerns. In Eu-
rope, the European Union ministers agreed to rules for marketing and labeling
genetically engineered foods, requiring labeling only when a product diers from
its natural counterpart, and not requiring comprehensive labeling. For exam-
ple, a tomato with a protein from another fruit or vegetable would need a label,
while sugar produced from a beet that had been genetically modied to resist
disease would not have to be labeled.
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47mutagenesis (for example, there are many genetically distinct tomatoes in
the United States derived from natural breeding techniques{ they do not require
specic labels simply because they have dierent traits); it is not clear that foods
modied through biotechnology should be subject to a dierent rule. The FDA
policy does require some labels, but only when they are necessary to alert the
consumer to a safety issue or to a dierence in a food from its traditional variety,
such as when a gene from a food that could cause an allergic reaction is trans-
ferred into another food, or when a food's composition is changed signicantly
(e.g. taking the vitamin C out of an orange). Presumably, agency oversight of
genetically altered products is adequate to detect these narrow kinds of safety
issues.
There are other reasons to discourage mandatory labeling of genetically al-
tered foods. Henry Miller, who was an ocial in the FDA from 1979 to 1994,
recently stated that even a strictly accurate message can mislead and confuse
consumers if it is irrelevant, unintelligible, or tells only part of the truth. Con-
sumers only need labels that give them information about a product's safety.
58 In addition, labels that are cluttered with ~ much information about the
product may be ineective by deemphasizing the most important nutritional
qualities of a product. Furthermore, it is unclear how many steps removed from
a genetically engineered product a food would have to be before a label would
no longer be required. As Miller stated in the
58Henry Miller, A Label We Don't Need, Wall Street Journal, March 18,
1996, at A18.
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48abovementioned article: Would special labels be required for pizza or burri-
tos containing cheese made with new-biotech-produced chymosin (renin)? Or for
chickens raised on feed from new biotech-manipulated corn, or vaccinated with
a new biotech vaccine?. In addition, imposing universal labeling requirements
for genetically altered foods would add to such foods' production costs{ Miller
anticipated having to segregate all biotech foods through planting, harvesting,
processing, ~ distribution{ and would competitively disadvantage genetically
altered products in the marketplace.
Finally, if labels were to be required prematurely at this new stage in the
development and marketing of genetically altered products, foods labeled as be-
ing genetically engineered may be irrationally avoided among consumers. Rigid
labeling requirements are not likely to do anything but cause consumers to dis-
criminate against genetically engineered foods. As has been the experience with
nutrition labeling in general, labels are ineective without a basic education as
to what the information on the labels means in a practical sense. Until the
USDA and the FDA can impart to consumers trustworthy, tested information
about genetically engineered products, the public will remain skeptical, and per-
ceptions that genetically altered foods are potentially threatening and unnatural
will persist. The experience with rBGH/rBST in Vermont is a case in point. A
group named Food & Water has aroused fears over rBGH, turning the public
against the substance and demanding that labels indicate products which are
rBGH-free. Merely providing a label at this point would
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49exacerbate the public's anxiety and steer the public away from certain prod-
ucts. Perhaps the controversy in Vermont could have been alleviated with ed-
ucating the public instead of letting the people get swept up with potentially
groundless fears.
The key is not to blindly label all genetically altered food products. Instead,
it is to educate the public in the eld of genetic manipulation{ a highly technical
eld now dominated by experts{ and to welcome lay participation in designing a
scheme for the regulation of genetically engineered foods. While food producers
have a right to advertise that they do ~ use genetic engineering techniques, even
this information may eventually be recognized as superuous by the educated
consumer.
A Possibility for Reaulatorv CooDeration
The FDA and the USDA both need to maintain relatively comprehensive
analyses of genetically altered products because each agency ultimately focuses
on dierent issues in its respective sphere. Although the USDA and the FDA
ostensibly both focus on the safety of the plant and the nature of the transferred
genetic material, the bulk of the USDA's inquiries relate to agricultural eects,
while the FDA is concerned with eects on food and humans. For example,
the kinds of plant pest characteristics that the USDA considers relate to the
susceptibility of the plant to disease, and its impact on other plants and organ-
isms. In contrast, the FDA focuses on eects on food products such as toxicity,
nutrient content, allergens, and antibiotic resistance. While both of these areas
are crucial
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50inquiries, they do not completely overlap. It is possible, therefore, that if the
USDA was to be the only agency to give premarket regulatory approval to genet-
ically altered products (thus giving biotechnology manufacturers license to enter
genetically altered foods into the United States markets), and the FDA was only
to impose postmarket controls, that an essential, distinct area of analysis could
potentially be overlooked (or at least only spot checked). It is uncertain whether
industry recommendations for the development of new genetically altered foods,
potential labeling requirements, and postmarket controls are enough to insure
that the quality of such food products will be suciently monitored, given pub-
lic hesitancy toward biotechnology and the fact that most of the genetically
altered products have not yet been widely tested on the market.
There is, however, a possibility for the kind of regulatory cooperation that
was endorsed in the Coordinated Framework. Interestingly, the diering na-
tures of the USDA and FDA inquiries correspond to the distinction between
agronomic and quality characteristics that the FDA described in its 1992 policy
statement. Since both agronomic and quality characteristics can be evaluated
through similar data, perhaps a viable system could be set up whereby obtaining
non-regulated status could be accomplished through a dual agronomic/quality
analysis of the genetically altered product. Manufacturers could be responsible
for submitting one set of information (including identity information, experi-
ment results, pertinent scientic and general publications, etc.), and the USDA
and the FDA could then evaluate
50
51this information separately for agronomic and quality characteristics. When
the USDA decides that an article is agronomically safe, that product could in
turn be evaluated by the FDA for quality control, even utilizing the USDA's
results as an analytical tool for expediency.
Even though this scheme would impose a great deal of regulatory responsi-
bility upon the FDA that it is not necessarily statutorily obligated to take on, it
would be advisable for a system such as this one to remain in place for at least
a few years{ a process which could gradually be streamlined as the agencies,
the market, and the public have sucient experience with genetically altered
foods. ~ Food additives have been deemed important enough for Congress to
mandate premarket approval; genetically altered products may present similar
concerns about safety, as new materials are added to traditional plant and food
varieties. Especially because genetically engineered products are rapidly becom-
ing more complex, the FDA should have an interest in premarket evaluation.
(Virus-resistant squash, for example, is likely to be much more complicated than
the Flavr-Savr tomato.) At least until the FDA has sucient experience with
enough nished genetically altered whole foods to decide that genetic
~ A sign that the American people are not satised with the degree of fed-
eral regulation of genetically altered foods is Minnesota's state rules regulating
genetically engineered organisms used in agricultural production or process-
ing. The state legislation has a system of release permits and notication, with
commercial exemptions for materials which have gone through federal agency
approval procedures (the Flavr-Savr earned such an exemption) Arguably, if
federal level regulation was deemed sucient, such a state procedure would not
need to exist. Additionally, regulation would ideally be at the federal and not
at the state level, as agricultural products and foods have the potential to have
widespread adverse impacts despite isolated state regulations.
51
52engineering processes present no signicant element of danger and that the
public has a sucient base of knowledge regarding genetically altered foods (e.g.
that the public is not exposed to allergens, toxins, or products with diminished
nutritional value, that the environment is not adversely aected, and that con-
sumers are comfortable with the products), premarket regulatory evaluation is
in the public interest. As dierent technologies are tested, approved, and mar-
keted, the process of evaluation may naturally become easier. At such a point,
less resource intensive methods could potentially come into play. However, only
when the time is right to increase regulatory leniency over genetically altered
foods should such methods be emphasized.
Conclusion
The key to knowledge is information; the key to information is research. The
USDA and the FDA should not cut corners before genetically altered plants and
food products are suciently established in the marketplace. Through coopera-
tion, each agency can eciently assess essential information and insure that the
genetically altered products that enter the United States markets are reliable.
Continuous dialogue not only between agencies, but also between the regulatory
and the private sectors is crucial to establish a rational response to the new tech-
nology. There is evidence of a current trend towards a more heightened sense of
agency awareness in this eld. For example, the FDA recently announced the
scheduling of a comprehensive discussion of the scientic criteria and principles
generally agreed upon by
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53scientists in the food safety community as necessary for demonstrating that
a food ingredient is safe. 60 This discussion, which will occur on May 15, 1996,
will be open to the public, and will address the fact that the advent of new
technologies such as genetic engineering of traditional foods and novel uses of
plant products. .. present new situations for which an alternative approach
to safety assessment may be needed. 61 Such initiative by an agency to as-
certain the need for information on the safety of genetically engineered plants
and foods is a welcome step, given the popular demand for governmental and
scientic response to the development of such products. After all, even if the
introduction of products altered by biotechnology is not (and should not be)
considered by the agencies quite as an attack of killer foods that requires all
out national retaliation, at the very least, it should be considered a substantial
enough incident to merit a material level of police action.
60 61 Fed. Reg. 8291 (March 4, 1996)
61 61 Fed. Reg. 8291 (March 4, 1996)
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